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AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF SELF-CONTROL
H. M. Shefrin and Richard Thaler
Abstract
Although many economists, most notably Strotz, have discussed
dynamic inconsistency and precommitment, none have dealt directly with
the essence of the problem: self—control. This paper attempts to fill
that gap by modeling man as an organization. The Strotz model is recast
to include the control features missing in his formulation. The organi-
zational analogy permits us to draw on the theory of agency. We thus
relate the individual's control problems with those that exist in agency
relationships.
Richard Thaler
Graduate School of Business
and Public Administration
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853The idea of self—control is paradoxical unless it is
assumed that the psyche contains more than one energy
system, and that these energy systems have some degree
of independence from each other.
Donald McIntosh [1969]
Introduction
Although economics has been applied to more and more kinds of problems
in recent years, the title of this paper may still raise more than a few
eyebrows. Why do we need an economic theory of self—control? What is
wrong with our traditional theories? Why should self—control be of
interest to economists? This introduction will try to answer these
questions and provide some information about the contents of the rest of
the paper. The answers to the questions involve several points.
1. A significant portion of consumer behavior is characterized by
the presence of self—control problems. It shouldn't be difficult to
visualize the importance self—control might have in understanding savings
behavior. This alone would justify its investigation. Yet we believe
that problems of self—control will be present to some degree in all
consumer decisions that involve intertemporal tradeoffs. This paper
is a first step toward a positive theory of intertemporal choice.
2. Our current theories are inadequate. A simple result from
standard constimer theory is that a consumer cannot improve his welfare
by restricting his choices. Yet people engage in such activities
frequently. In fact, savings behavior is nearly dominated by
institutions that reduce the individual's flexibility. Some examples2
are Christmas clubs, mandatory pension plans, social security, payroll
savings plans, whole life insurance policies, and piggy banks. Christmas
clubs have always been a real puzzle for economists. Formany years
Christmas clubs paid no interest and were seemingly dominated by other
forms of saving such as simple savings accounts. It is obvious that
their popularity was due to their value as a self—control device. We
claim that the popularity of the other institutions cited is also
related in varying degrees to the same attribute.
3. Our proposed theory is simple, uses standard economic tools,
and yet describes actual behavior. Our basic advance is simply therecog-
nition of self—control as a problem. Our model explicitly deals with
consumer choice as a control problem. As the quotation above suggests,
self—control seems to necessarily imply the existence of a controller
and a controllee. Individuals are thus assumed to behave as if they
possessed two separate sets of preferences. These two aspects of their
personality are referred to as the planner and the doer. By modeling
behavior in this way we seem to have taken the only reasonable course.
Once this formulation is adopted it becomes apparent that Individuals
share many of the control problems found in organizations. The resulting
analogy can be exploited to test the model. If individuals are like
organizations facing control problems, then they should adopt many of the
same strategies for solving these problems. In fact, we observe that they
do.
The plan for the paper is as follows. The economic literature that
has come closest to discussing self—control is that which has followed
the classic paper by Strotz. We thus begin our paper in Section I with a3
statement of Strotz's theoretical problem. Section II contains our justifi-
cation for adopting a two—self model. We draw heavily in this section on
the work of Donald Mcintosh. Section III presents our formal model. We
show that standard economic tools can be used even if the unified self is
dropped. Section IV describes a control problem in an organization to
illustrate the techniques that can be used to reduce the costs arising from
conflicts of interest. Section V shows how the same techniques are used by
individuals to deal with their problems of self—control. Section VI dis-
cusses some empirical implications of our model. Section VII contains a
short summary.4
I. Dynamic Inconsistency and Self-Control S
Whydopeople impose constraints on their future behavior? This
is the question which motivated us to write this paper, and it is a
question which has attracted the attention of economists since the
seminal paper by Strotz [1955]. Strotz's answer hinges on the obser-
vation that most peoplets tastes change over time in a systematic way.
While Strotz's discussion contains many useful insights into the problem,
he fails to deal directly with self—control, and this we feel renders
his model inadequate. We will begin by summarizing his argument.
Strotz considers an individual with a nonnegative stock K(O) of
an exhaustible resource at time 0. The individual must decide on a con-
sumption plan c(.) by which he will deplete the resource over a finite
time interval [0,T]. Let U[c(t), t] be the utility accruing at a time t and
A(t, T) the rate of discount applied to U[c(t), t] when viewed from time





In following a plan c(.), the amount of resource used up between times 0
and T is just fTc(t) dt. Consequently, the amount of the resources
remaining at time T is simply
K(i) =K(0)-fc(t)dt (3)
The plan c*(.) that maximizes the above problem is called the
original Noticethat A(t,0) is the rate of discount applied to
U[c(t), t] in the determination of c*(.). Of course, the individualts 55
tastes may have changed at T because he will discount at rate A(t, T)
and not A(t,O) (if X(t, T) is not independent of t). Will the individual
want to alter the original plan when his tastes change? That is, will he
want to reallocate the remaining amount K(T)? One of Strotz's conclusions
Is that the individual will not alter the original plan If X(t, T) Is
exponential in t—tI; otherwise he will. If the original plan Is altered,
then the individual is said to display dynamic inconsistency.
This result is Illustrated in figure 1. Suppose an individual
must choose between a small reward x at time t and a larger reward y
at time t'. Time is measured horizontally with "today" at the origin.
The present value of either alternative is given by the height of its
respective curve at any point in time. Dynamic inconsistency is shown in
panel a.
:igure la figure lb
If the decision between x and y is made any timebeforet*, y will be
chosen. However, between t and t (the time just before x would be
received) x will be preferred to y. Thus, if the choice is made before
t*, the individual will want to change his mind once t arrives. If the
discount function is exponential, then the curves will never cross (as in
panel b) and choices will be dynamically consistent.
j6
What will an individual do if he recognizes this inconsistency? One
strategy Strotz suggests is that of precommitment.
Today it will be rational for a man to jettison his "optimal" plan of
yesterday, not because his tastes have changed in any unexpected way
nor because his knowledge of the future is different, but because
today he is a different person with a new discount function——the old
one shifted forward in time. Yet, it is also rational for the man
today to try to ensure that he will do tomorrow that which is best
from the standpoint of today's desires.2
Since the individual knows his preferences will change he precommits behavior
to enforce his current preferences on himself later. Strotz claims that this
is rational. Yet, while the change of preferences hypothesized by Strotz is
necessary for precommitment to be rational, it is not sufficient. Consider
the plight of a man with the following preferences: at 3:00 PM he prefers
fish over meat for dinner, while at dinner time, he prefers meat over fish.
If he does his shopping at 3:00 PM and knows that his preferences will
change, what should he buy? For it to be rational to buy fish, we must add
another condition which is implicit in Strotz's reasoning: namely, that the
earlier preferences are judged in some sense to be "right."
Another example will illustrate the point. Suppose an individual
observes that whenever he goes to a restaurant the combination of his hunger
and the pleasant aromas emerging from the kitchen induce him to order more
than he can eat. He is aware of this tendency to order too much, but never
seems to overcome it. However, if he called in his order at 3:00 PM when
less hungry and away from the aromas, he would order the correct amount. In
this example, precoinmitment seems entirely sensible since it overcomes a
systematic bias which the individual recognizes.
In fact Strotz's subsequent discussion demonstrates that he does view
the early preferences as "right." Dynamic inconsistency can occur whenever7
the discount function is not exponential, but Strotz has in minda particular
shape of the discount function:
Special attention should be given, I feel, to a discount function...
which differs from a logarithmically linear one in that it "over
values" the more proximate satisfaction relative to the more distant
ones. .. .Myown supposition is that most of us are "born" with [such]
discount functions. .
Ifthe instantaneous discount rate Is plotted over time, then Strotz is
hypothesizing a function which has the shape illustrated in Figure 2. In





but the rate applied to two "later" options will be much lower. Strotz is
not very explicit about why he supposes we are born with such discount func—
tions, but he cites Böhm—Bawerk who is explicit.
It is one of the most pregnant facts of experience that we attach a
less importance to future pleasures and pains simply because they are
future... To goods which are destined to meet the wants of the future,
we ascribe a value which is really less than the true intensity of
their future marginal utility... Which of us has not been surprised to
find that under the pressure of some momentary appetite, he was not
able to refuse some favorite dish or cigar which the doctor had for—
bidden——knowing perfectly that he was doing an injury to his health,
which, calm consideration would tell him, was much more considerable
than the pleasure of that trifling indulgence?... Any one who knows
himself, and keeps his eyes open to what is going on around him, will
find this fact of the underestimate of future pleasures and pains
exhibited under a thousand forms in the midst of our civilized society.
Of the fact then there is no doubt.8
Three reasons are given for this phenomenon: want of imagination, defect in
will, and the uncertainty of life. It is defect of will, however, which
leads B6hm—Bawerk to suggest a discount function of the shape illustrated in
Figure 2.
I should like to call special attention, further, to the fact, that the
undervaluation which results from these causes is not at all graduated
harmoniously, in the subjective valuation of the individuals, according
to the length of the time that intervenes.., On the contrary, the
original subjective undervaluations are, in the highest degree, unequal
and irregular. In particular, so far as the undervaluation is caused
by defects of will, there may be a strong difference between an enjoy-
ment which offers itself at the very moment, and one which does not;
while, on the other hand, there may be a very small difference, or no
difference at all, between enjoyment which is pretty far away, and one
which is farther away.5
We agree.
While Strotz never mentions self—control explicitly, he does discuss
the tendency of lower income people to "gorge themselves with food after
pay—day; overheat their homes when they have money for a bucket of coal;...
go on sprees on pay—day; engage in heavy installment buying.. "etc.all of
which he says "can be explained as a failure to cope intelligently with the
problem of the intertemporal tussle."7 What is the "intertemporal tussle"
if not the lack of self—control?
Finally, consider Strotz's remarks on consumer sovereignty:
I would have confidence in the judiciousness of a person today.. .to
decide how much to save and how much to spend for the rest of his life
starting a couple years from now... The real decisions to worry about
are those where an immediate or proximate satisfaction is gained at the
expense of still—more—future costs. Preconimitments may be regarded as
either good or evil, depending upon whether the period of precommitment
begins now or later.8
These remarks, while insightful and sensible, cannot be justified by Strotz's
model. What in Strotz's model leads him to the conclusion that some precom—
mitments are good and others are evil? Why are decisions whose impact only9
begins a couple years from now considered good? The remarks seem to be based
not on the model (in which it is always rational to do what is best given
today's preferences) but rather on Strotz's value judgment that the high
discount rates observed in the short run are inappropriate. To make the
model complete, however, it is only necessary to have the Individual share
Strotz's value judgment. Since delay of gratification is more difficult as
the object of desire draws nearer, observed discount rates become high in the
short run. Sophisticated Individuals will recognize this internal, systematic
bias and, like the man in the restaurant, they will rationally take steps to
reduce the costs of this bias. The contribution of this paper is to explic—
itly recognize these costs, and to show how they can be incorporated into an
economic model of intertemporal choice.10
II. The Incoherent Self
Strotz hypothesizes a non—exponential discount function whichproduces
dynamic inconsistency. To complete the model all that isnecessary is to
incorporate the conflict which this inconsistency will inevitablyproduce.
Conflict arises because the individual recognizes hisown weaknesses. Plans
made in advance are consistently broken because "temptation"becomes too
great. What the person knows to be his best long run interests conflict
with his short run desires. To model such conflict it is usefulto assume
the individual acts as if he were influenced by twoseparate sets of prefer-
ences, in essence a two—self model. This idea is also advocated by Donald
McIntosh [19691 in a book which has strongly influenced ourpresentation.
In his chapter entitled, "The Psychology of Rational Action," McIntosh
evaluates utility theory from a psychological perspective. We willvery
briefly summarize his ideas.
Standard utility theory models man as a sophisticated,maximizing agent.
How does man acquire the skills necessary for him to actrationally?
McIntosh notes that individuals are born not with coherentpurposes but with
drives or needs. The satisfaction of these needs requires the establishment
of certain relationships with the outside world. Theserelationships are
established as the individual matures. During this time, a coherent idea of
selfhood develops; however, a considerable amount of psychic conflict is
always present. This necessitates that some impulses toward drive satisfac—
tion be blocked because of the existence of a multiplicity of drive mecha-
nisms.
The needs of the individual are not one butmany; they are present now,
but they will also be present in the future.11
Short—term satisfactions must be weighed against longer—run results...
In a word, self—control is needed.
The idea of self—control is paradoxical unless it is assumed that the
psyche contains more than one energy system, and that these energy
systems have some degree of independence from each other.9
The last sentence is precisely the position we take in this paper.
McIntosh continues by citing two situations in which traditional utility
theory cannot be applied. The first situation, which he calls discontinuity
of purpose, refers to intertemporal preferences that change over time. He
calls the second situation incoherence of purpose. Incoherence refers to
the presence of psychic conflict at a single point in time——which is to say
that the individual is influenced by more than one preference system. This
distinction cannot be overemphasized. In particular, the reader should note
that Strotz's model is based only on discontinuity of purpose. Yet, Strotz's
remark that "the real decisions to worry about are those where an immediate
satisfaction is gained at the expense of.. .future costs," is entirely
consistent with McIntosh's statement about independent energy systems. The
major contribution of this paper is the incorporation of incoherence of
purpose into a formal model of individual behavior.
We model incoherent purpose by treating an individual as if he contained
two distinct psyches which we will denote the planner and the doer. These
terms help stress the analogy between an individual with a self—control
problem and an organization with a principal—agent problem. We will exploit
that analogy extensively in Sections IV and V. The planner/doer framework
is developed in a formal model in Section III, but we should point out here
that it is consistent with McIntosh's view of the individual as a combination
of a system of coherent drives together with a coherent idea of self. The
doer corresponds to McIntosh's drives, being concerned only with "short—term12
. satisfactions,"while the planner corresponds to the coherent ideas of the
self, it being concerned with the tradeoff between "short—term satisfactions"
and "longer—run results." Before turning to the model, thereremain two
final concepts in McIntosh's discussion which willprove quite useful. They
are external autonomy and internal autonomy. Quite simply, externalautonomy
refers to the best the individual can do for himself when he isfully
coherent while internal autonomy denotes the best he can do whensome degree
of psychic conflict is present.
.
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III. Modeling Incoherent Purposes
In this section we will elaborate on our description of the planner and
the doer, and will present a formal model of an individual with incoherent
purposes. We have several reasons for developing a mathematical formulation
of our model. First, the formal treatment makes explicit the role of the
planner and the doers. Second, by structuring our model to closely resemble
that of Strotz, we facilitate comparisons of our theory to the existing
literature.10 Third, the formal model makestransparent the close corre-
spondence between our theory and the theory of agency. We draw on this
correspondence in Section 4. Fourth, we show that the recognition of
incoherence and inconsistency does not preclude the use of the traditional
tools of economic theory. Finally, we hope to show that economic analysis
can be used to gain insights into what many may consider a purely psycho-
logical phenomenon.
We will cast our model in a discrete time framework. Consider an
individual with a fixed income stream y =[y1,y2, ...T1The individual
is assumed to choose a nonnegative level of consumption c in period t;call
c =[c1,c2, ...cT a consumption plan.
What features does McIntosh cite which are absent in Strotz? First,
McIntosh associates a set of independent energy systems or drives to the
individual; these correspond to the incoherent parts of the self. Second,
the self also has a coherent part. It is this part that in McIntosh's terms
attempts to balance off "shorter—term satisfactions" against "longer—run
results." Third, there remains present within the individual a degree of
psychic conflict. In other words, the individual is never completely
integrated.14
How can these features be introduced into the Strotz framework?
We introduce these features by viewing the individual as an organization
unto himself. The organization consists of T+l components: T distinct
doers (one for each period) and a single planner. The period t doer is
assumed to exercise direct control over the period t consumption level
c. Doer t corresponds to an independent energy system. Its associated
drive is represented by a utility function Z(.). Zt(ct) denotes the
degree of immediate or "short—term satisfaction" that accrues if c is
consumed in period t. Assume that Z is a strictly increasing concave
function.
Strotz certainly recognized some of these features as is evidenced
by the following quotation:
The individual over time is an infinity of individuals,
and the familiar problems of interpersonal utility
comparisons are there to plague us. The interpersonal
aspect of the intertemporal problem becomes clear if we
think of a similar problem involving a family of brothers
where each has a utility functional depending not only
on his own utility but upon a weighted sum of the
utilities of all of them. Suppose the oldest brother
always has the power to allocate the annual proceeds of
an estate, but with it being foreknown that each year
one brother will die off, the oldest next.
The basic difference between our model and Strotz's would seem to be that
Strotz considered an individual to be a system of doers with no planner.
In addition, each Strotz doer has some concern for the other doers whereas
our doers are completely selfish.12





Notice that this implies the existence of a perfect capital market. The
multiplicity of drive mechanisms [Z1, Z2, ...,ZT]are in mutual conflict
as a result of (7). Consequently, the coherent part of the self must be
identified with the Individual's ability to express consistent preferences
over the achievement of his various drives. The planner effectively fills
this role. The planner's preferences are represented by a utility
function V(Z1, Z2, ...,ZT).
An individual is represented by his energy system [V, Zj,...,ZTI.
We have now incorporated the first two McIntosh features described above.
The third and final aspect centers on psychic Integration. If the
individual were fully integrated, then the planner would choose a con-
sumption plan to





In McIntosh's terminology, this refers to the achievement of external
autonomy. However, McIntosh asserts that external autonomy is not possible
in general because of the absence of full psychic integration. The best
the individual can hope to do is achieve internal autonomy. The impediment
to the achievement of external autonomy lies, of course, with the doers.
It is the period t doer, not the planner, that exercises control over
the period t decisionc. In particular, doer t is oriented towards16
.
achievingmaximum short—term satisfaction not longer—run gain V.In
fact, an unrestrained doer 1 would borrow Y —y1
on the capital market and
therefore choose c1 =Y;the resulting consequence is naturally c2 =c3
=
= CT=0.Such action would suggest a complete absence of psychic
integration.
What can the planner do to exert some control over the doers? In
general he has two instruments he Can use. First, he can impose rules
on the doers behavior. The rules alter the doers behavior by changing
the constraints. One possible rule would be to purchase an annuity
which allocates each doer a specific consumption level. A less restrictive
rule would be to simply forbid borrowing.
The second instrument available to the planner is to alter the doers
utility function directly. The goal would be to produce a new function
which has an internal maximum. In Figure 3 the original doer utility





utility necessary for an internal maximum is to reduce the overall level
of arousal and thus total utility. So the altered utility function will
resemble Z2. Altering the utility function to Z3 such that satiation is
reached earlier while utility is increased is considered infeasible, as
is introducing a discontinuity at the desired level of consumption, such
4
as Z
To model the modification of the doer's utility function, we introduce
a modification parameter 0 =(Gi'e2, ...°THenceforth, Z is assumed
to be a function of two arguments, c and If =0,then the doer
is completely unrestrained. As O increases, both Z and are reduced
2 c
as in Z in Figure 3. To provide a specific example, 0 might be thought
of as a guilt parameter. The higher is O, the more guilt the doer feels
for any level of c.
Define c(O) to be the consumption level doer t chooses to maximize
Zt(c, whenthe planner picks O• If sufficient modification has
taken place so that has an internal maximum, then c <= Y—c.
s< t
We can now write down the planner's problem in the discretionary
mode. Let Z(c*(0),®) =[Z1(c(01),0) ...Z(c(0T),0T1Then the







The solution to this problem entails the usual sort of marginal conditions.
In this case the planner will increase until the marginal loss to the
planner from the resulting decrease in doer t's utility is equal to the
marginal gain to the planner from the increases in utility to all future
doers. Both the gain and the loss have twocomponents.Doer t is worse
off from a rise in becausehe consumes less and because he enjoys each
unitofconsumption less. Similarly future doers gain both because there
is more income remaining and because less future modification will be
employed.
In the more general problem, the planner can choose not just 0 but
also the set of formal constraints (or rules) he wishes to impose on the
doers. We will present details of this more general problem in our next
paper on this subject. For our present purposes we will just move on
to discuss what actual devices individuals use in dealing with self—
control problems. We will begin by examining what organizations do when
facing similar problems.19
IV. Rules vs. Discretion: An Organizational Analogy
We have modeled an individual facing a self—control problem as an
organization with a principal—agent or conflict of interest problem. If
this analogy is apt, then we should find that the devices used by organi-
zations to minimize the costs imposed by conflicts of interest are also
used by individuals in intertemporal choice situations. In this section
we will develop a specific example of an organizational control problem.
Its applicability to individuals is examined in Section 5.
Consider the case of a bank that is run by an owner—manager. One
of the functions which the owner serves is that of loan officer. He
determines which applicants should be granted loans. Two kinds of pro-
cedures are used. The applicant fills out a report which Is coded and
run through a 'tcredit scoring" program which predicts the probability
of default. In our terminology the credit scoring procedure Is a rule.
This rule can also be supplemented or supplanted by the judgment of the
owner based on information gathered in a personal interview. The interview
judgment process is labeled discretion.
Since the interviews are more costly to conduct, the owner would
rely completely on the credit scoring procedure if it were equally ef-
fective. However, the interview may permit the owner to gather informa-
tion which is difficult to obtain on a written application (such as
"appearance") or is difficult to process quantitatively (such as nervous-
ness in response to particular questions). The owner will utilize the
interview if the extra precision in granting loans results in sufficient
extra profits to cover the extra costs. Now assume that the owner hires
an employee to process loan applications. Suppose further that the owner20
used both the credit scoring procedure and the interview because the
additional accuracy of the interview more than made up for the extra cost.
Finally assume that the employee is just as skillful as the owner in
judging loan applications. While the production function does not appear to
have changed, it may now be profitable to abandon the interview. The
reason for this is that the incentives facing the employee may not be
the same as those facing the owner. The equal skill assumption means that
if the employee were the owner he would make decisions identical to
(or as good as) the current owner's, but as an employee who does not get
to keep the profits of his section, his decisions may differ. He may
become careless, lazy or even dishonest. This will create an incentive
to adopt rules. The situation described is now analogous to that of an
individual facing a problem of self control. He (like the owner) knows
what he should do, but can't get himself (the employee) to do it.
Agency costs can be defined as the difference between the profits
of the firm that would occur if every agent had the same objective
function as the owner and the actual profits (or the difference between
external autonomy and internal autonomy).15Organizations will choose
a mix of rules and discretion designed to minimize agency costs. Rules
are used to reduce the opportunities for the employee to misbehave.
Discretion must be combined with appropriate incentives. Some specific
strategies for the bank example will illustrate the basic techniques.
If no interviews are permitted then the bank is using a pure rule
strategy. Twotechniquescan be used to introduce a limited amount of
discretion. First, the bank might have the credit scoring program produce
.21
a cardinal score (rather than a zero or one). This score might be the
estimate probability of default, p. A pure rule would be to grant loans
only if p <p*.Limited discretion could be added by allowing the program
to be overruled over a certain range. So, for example, all loans with
scores less than p —S,would be approved and all with scores greater than
p* + S would be rejected, and over the range p* —5to p* +tSthe employee
would decide.
Second, certain classes of decisions mayberemoved from discretion.
Thus, the owner might feel that some loans are particularly likely to be
associated with large divergence between the interests of the employer and
the employee. Examples might be loans to friends and relatives, or very
large loans. These particular decisions might be removed from the employee's
discretion. Which decisions to remove will depend not just on the proba-
bility of malfeasance but also on the cost of determining when the rule
should apply. So abolishing discretion for "attractive clients" might be
advisable in theory but infeasible because of the difficulty in defining an
attractive client. Once any discretion is permitted the bank will try to
reduce the agency costs by creating an environment in which the employee's
interests are as close as possible to the employer's. Three basic methods
can be used to alter the employee's incentives. First, the employer can
monitor the employee's inputs, or the decisions themselves. A random
sampling of interviews with appropriate penalties for incorrect decisions
is an example. Second, the employer can monitor outputs. Setting up the
loan department as a profit center with the employee's salary determined
by profits would be a strategy of this type. Third, the owner can try to
alter the employee's interests through moral suasion. Many profit—sharing22
.
arrangementsmay be based on this concept. Most profit—sharing systems
provide very little actual incentive to any employee since his share of
marginal profits is minute. But, by "giving the employees a share of the
profitst' the firm changes the way employees think about the firm. Though
moral suasion and social norms are typically sneered at by economists, they
explain a great deal of otherwise mysterious behavior such as tipping in
strange out—of—town restaurants and cleaning up campgrounds.
The preceding analysis applies to any form of organization. The
organization should select some combination of rules and incentives to
minimize agency costs. The actual mix selected will depend on the relative
costs of each strategy. This observation has an interesting implication for
our understanding of the workings of government bureaucracies and other non-
profit organizations. A characteristic all such organizations share is that
output is difficult to measure. Because of this, the various incentive
strategies open to profit—making firms will be either awkward or impossible
to implement. The Army cannot, for example, set up a platoon as a profit
center! This implies that such organizations will be forced to rely on
rules to a greater extent than will firms. Since bureaucracies cannot
measure output they are forced to use rules to approximate the goals of the
organization and then monitor the adherence to these rules.
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V. The Techniques of Self—Control
Walter Mischel, a prominent psychologist who has conducted experiments
on self—control for over a decade, suggests that self—control should be
thought of as a two—stage process. In the first stage the individual
must choose to wait for the more preferred but delayed outcome. In
our model this corresponds to the preferences of the planner. The second
stage is the execution of the delay. During this stage it helps if "the
person can convert the difficult aversive 'self—control' situation into
one which he can master more easily."6 Thus the second stage entails
getting the doer to follow the plan. This section investigates the
techniques of self—control—--those strategies which the individual uses
to make the difficult easier. The techniques we describe are those
suggested by our model and by the bank analogy from the previous section.
We have several objectives we hope to meet in this section. First,
we want to describe the kinds of behavior we should expect to observe
in self—control situations. It should be stressed that these are rational,
maximizing solutions to choice problems in a second—best world. In fact,
we show that individuals use the same strategies to deal with self—control
problems that profit maximizing firms use to deal with conflicts of
interest. The strategies are rational because the costs of self—control
are real (just as agency costs are real). Second, we can explain some
kinds of behavior which seem irrational. By rationalizing seemingly
irrational behavior we can make positive statements about when and where
we should expect to observe it. Third, we will try to indicate some of
the weaknesses in the neoclassical theory of intertemporal choice, again
pointing to the specific situations in which the theory is most likely to
fail.24
We will proceed as follows. The two basic instruments the planner
can use in our model are rules and discretion. Rules operate by altering
the constraints imposed on any given doer. Discretion must be accompanied
by some method of altering the incentives or rewards to the doer. Ob-
viously, these incentives must have short run payoffs. Both rules and
discretion can be implemented either with external help or purely internally.
Furthermore, many strategies involve a combination of both rules and
discretion. We will describe each technique in turn: discretion (external
and internal), external (or pure) rules, and combined strategies (internal
rules—of—thumb and opportunity manipulations). For each strategy we
indicate its particular advantages and disadvantages and illustrate with
everyday examples usually taken from savings or dieting behavior. Where
possible we point to specific institutions which have arisen to meet the
demands for externally imposed self—control aids. We conclude the section
with a discussion of the desirable characteristics of rules—of—thumb.
We hope this section will answer the following questions: Why do
people impose rules on themselves? What happens when no rule is used?
What characterizes a good rule? What determines the choice between rules,
discretion, and various combinations?
Discretion
The essential feature of discretion is that the doer is allowed to
choose in an unconstrained way. Thus if behavior is to be altered, the
incentives facing the doer must be modified. We will describe how this
can be done.
If external help can be used then the simplest strategy is torearrange
the short—run rewards for a specific activity. An extreme example is the S25
drug antibuse used by alcoholics. The effect of this drug is to make the
user sick iimnediately after taking a drink. Less extreme but more salient
to academics is the practice of agreeing to give a paper at a conference to
see that it will in fact get written. Again, this works because as the
conference draws near, failure to write the paper will result in immediate
costs (abuse from the organizer). Similarly, some college basketball
players who have signed professional contracts before graduating have
asked for special clauses to be included in their contract specifying
that a large bonus ($10,000) will be paid immediately upon graduation.
Since the returns to finishing will only begin after their basketball
career is over this acts to shift some of the reward forward. Finally,
some people simply make a bet with a friend: "I will pay you $200
if I smoke another cigarette."
The same basic idea can be done purely internally. Thus some people
deny themselves some reward until they finish some unpleasant task. An
ingenious variation on this idea is Ainslee's "private side bet."17 The
essence of many self—control problems (smoking, dieting, saving) is that
each particular instance of restraint has only a trivial long—run gain.
Just one cigarette (donut, spree) will have no significant effect on
lifetime health (weight, wealth). Yet, at the time, the utility of the
immediate reward may loom very large. Compare the utility of a tanta-
lizing dessert with the loss in utility of weighing an extra gram!
Yet If all decisions are made on this basis, the individual will never
restrain, and the cumulative effects will be significant. To overcome
this Ainslee suggests that the individual might tie all acts of a specific
form of restraint together. In essence he bets with himself that he will26
never eat donuts. He will want to keep this bet as long as the utility
from eating donuts is less than the utility of the weight loss associated
with not eating donuts. If the scheme works it is because the individual
perceives that breaking the rule even once will jeopardize the entire
routine. Thus the cost of eating a donut would be viewed not just as
the weight gain from one donut but the weight gain from a lifetime of
donuts. If this perception is correct it seems like it must be based
on two aspects of the technology of restraint. First, good behavior can
be habit—forming. (The costs of restraint decline with continual practice.)
Second, such habits are very easily broken. Both aspects seem accurate
descriptions of human behavior.
Two other internal incentive alteration techniques are worth men-
tioning: monitoring and moral suasion. Self—monitoring is simply the
process of keeping track of various activities. "Weight—watchers," a
diet club, uses this technique extensively, as its name suggests. Not
only are outputs monitored through weekly weigh—ins (with appropriate
reinforcement) but members are instructed to weigh and count carefully
everything they eat. It seems that in many self—control situations simply
keeping track helps cut down on the undesirable activity.
Moral suasion can also be effective if short—run incentives can be
so altered. Essentially, moral suasion involves the adoption of some
norm. An example would be to view saving as a goal in and of itself. 18
Ifthe planner can convince the doer to adopt this norm then the doer will
save in spite of myopic preferences. Saving will provide positive current
utility. Guilt can work the same way, though in the opposite direction.
If overeating is considered bad in and of itself then the problem pointed
out by Ainslee is minimized.27
Pure Rules —ExternalEnforcement
.but you must bind me hard and fast, so that I cannot stir from the
spot where you will stand me.. .andif I beg you to release me, you must
tighten and add to my bonds.
Strotz begins his article with the above well—known quote from The
Odyssey. The solution which Ulysses adopts to his self—control problem is
an externally enforced precomniltment. In general, precommitment can be a
very effective self—control strategy. Examples are pension plans, fat farms
(where you pay not to be fed) and even wiring one's jaw closed. The advan-
tage of these strategies is that once in place they require little or no
self enforcement. In terms of our model, if a pure rule is used then 0 can
be left at zero. This implies that the level of utility will not have to be
reduced. In some cases, precommitinent may be the only way to partake in an
activity. Gamblers, for instance, often bring only as much cash as they are
willing to lose, and like Ulysses instruct their friends in advance not to
loan them additional funds no matter what they may say later. Institutions
which sell precommitment services are very common in the areas of dieting,
saving, smoking and drinking. Of course, economically, the savings institu-
tions, especially pension plans, are most important.
Strotz finds precommitment so compelling that he writes: "What needs
to be explained is not that people do precoinmit their future actions, but
that the practice is not still more wide—spread."19 Strotz offers one
reason, uncertainty as to future tastes and opportunities. "Because of risk
and uncertainty, people are also willing to pay for options permitting them
a greater range of choice at future dates... "20 Though this may in fact be
the most significant defect of precommitment, there is another reason why
alternative strategies will be used.28
. Purerules require external help which may be either unavailableor,
equivalently, too expensive. The expense may arise because actual physical
restraint is required, as in fat farms, and so the precommitment is only
feasible for short intervals. Alternatively, the expensemay result from
the difficulty in defining the legitimate exceptions which occur in an
uncertain world. Of course Strotz may have failed to recognize the full
range of alternatives to precommitment which also help explain its limited
use.
Combined Strategies
In the bank analogy, the owner could combine rules with some discretion
by limiting either the range over which the discretion could be exercised or
by limiting the domain of discretion to relatively "safe't decisions. Both
combinations are used by individuals as well. We will refer to these S
strategies as internal rules and opportunity manipulation, respectively.
Internal Rules
Our continual observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly leads
us to form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit
and proper either to be done or to be avoided.
Adam Smith [1759]
We have identified two extreme modes of savings behavior. Pure discre-
tion is characterized by the individual deciding in each period how much to
save without any self-imposed constraints. A pure rule eliminates all
choice, perhaps with the help of an annuity. Obviously there are many
alternative strategies which lie somewhere between these extremes. We call
these Intermediate cases internal rules because generally they are self—
enforced rules—of—thumb, rather than externally enforced precommitments.
Two points should be stressed here. First, almost any external rule can be29
used internally. Second, almost any external rule can be defeated at some
cost. Purchasing an annuity, for example, serves no purpose if the individual
is free to borrow at will. Thus the distinction between internal and external
rules is somewhat blurred. Which is chosen depends on a comparison of costs.
External rules usually have lower self—enforcement costs but higher monetary
costs and less flexibility.
In the context of our savings model we can identify some likely rules—
of—thumb between pure discretion and a pure rule. Each rule alters the
budget constraint facing the doer. A natural first departure from pure
discretion would be to introduce a ban on borrowing. We maintain the nota-
tion that is current income and Y is the present value of remaining




.Thenon a no—borrowing regime the budget constraint is
t=l
simply c + S. A somewhat weaker rule which seems common is to prohibit
borrowing except for specific purchases: say houses and automobiles. The
existence of such rules—of—thumb may explain some apparently irrational
behavior. Many students are eligible for subsidized loans at very favorable
rates and yet fail to borrow. Why? It Is unlikely that their rates of time
preference are less than the 3% interest charged on some of these loans, and
in any case the money could be placed in a savings account for a sure gain.
While some students do exactly this, many do not. Similarly, countries with
high rates of inflation and regulated Interest rates (like Israel) provide
strong incentives to bcrrow which many fail to take advantage of. An aversion
to borrowing p se seems the best explanation of these anomalies.
Another simple rule—of—thumb is a prohibition on dissaving combined with
limits on borrowing. If borrowing is banned then the budget constraint30
. becomesc Ifborrowing is permitted up to some level, say B, then the
constraint becomes c <y+ B. This rule-of--thumb may explain why many
people borrow and lend simultaneously in spite of a substantial difference in
interest rates. A particularly striking example is the institution of the
'pass book loan." This institution allows consumers to borrow money using
their savings account balance as collateral. While the interest rate paid is
less than for an unsecured loan, it is still higher than the rate paid on the
savings account. Thus the transaction seems dominated by the alternative of
simply withdrawing some of the savings. Self—control seems to play a crucial
role in explaining this institution. People find it attractive either because
they don't want to dissave or because they value the regularized repayment
plan associated with the loan, or both.
Each of the above rules may be combined with a savings plan. An example
of such a plan would be to save at least s% of income in each period, with
the discretion to save more but not less. Here the budget constraint becomes
c <(1 until retirement. Institutions such as "payroll savings"
where a certain amount is deducted each pay period toward the purchase of
savings bonds or some other savings instrument are examples of this kind of
plan. Since the plan can be stopped at any time and the savings are very
liquid it is obviously an internal rule.
Mandatory pension plans and social security are nearly pure rules since
both dropping out and withdrawing funds are difficult or impossible. How-




•. . meanwhileI took a large round of wax, cut it up small with my
sword, and kneaded the pieces with all the strength of my fingers.
The wax soon yielded to my vigorous treatment and grew warm... Itook
each of my men in turn and plugged their ears with it...
The Odyssey
Since Ulysses' crew needed to have their hands free to row, he had to
employ a different strategy for them, so he filled their ears with wax.
Since the Sirens were seductive, pure discretion was also not feasible. In
general, seductive goods will require special consideration, as in the bank
example. This implies that c should be considered a vector, so we denote
the level of good i consumed in period t bycit. If 0 is also good specific
_6c*.
then we can use as a measure of how seductive good I is. If a good
is highly seductive then in utility terms discretion will be very costly.
The best alternative may be to avoid the good altogether. Thus dieters
refuse invitations to lavish dinner parties rather than go and try to stick
sc*
to their diet. In the absence of outright prohibition, variations in
imply that the individual will appear more impatient with goods that are more
seductive. In other words, the discount function implicit in observed
Sc*.
behavior will be good—specific. Similarly if depends on the situation
it
then even the implicit discount functions for specific goods will be dynam-
ically unstable.21
A concept related to the seductive good is the addictive or habit—
forming good. One way to define an addictive good is that it becomes more
seductive as it is consumed. A possible measure of the degree to which a
good is addictive would then be It is easy to see that
uc1t it+l
addictive goods present a special problem in self—control, especially if the
good is seductive to begin with. Drugs such as heroin, alcohol, and32
. tobaccoare the obvious examples. The current doer receives all the benefits
of consuming an addictive good while the costs, in terms of future attempts
to control behavior as well as harmful side—effects are all imposed on future
doers. Pure rules may be an attractive strategy, and could explain some of
the support for legal prohibitions we have observed over the years. For
those who find the good initially seductive, no other strategy is likely to
be successful. We conjecture that most people who manage to avoid becoming
smokers simply found the practice originally distasteful. Very few people
seem to avoid the temptation to "just try it." The costs of addiction to
heroin, on the other hand, are high enough to scare most people away.
Of course "habits" can be both good and bad. For some goods it seems
likely that some modification today will make the good less seductive
tomorrow. This possibility underscores the value of giving children "proper
training."
The correspondence between the individual's problem of self—control and
the agency problem faced by an organization is illustrated in Table 1 which




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The preceding discussion has argued that people will sometimes use
internal rules of—thumb to resolve dynamic inconsistencies rather than
external precommitments or pure discretion. What form will these rules—of--
thumb take? We can identify several characteristics that are desirable:
1.Simplicity. A rule—of—thumb can only work if the doer decision
process is somehow by—passed. If a rule is too complicated and the doer has
to figure out how to apply the rule then its value will be lost.
2. No Exceptions. The ideal rule has no exceptions. If exceptions are
necessary they should be very well defined cases. Again, if the doer has to
decide whether or not the rule applies, its value is severely diminished.
3. Dynamic Stability. This is closely related to no exceptions.
Frequent changes in the rule are comparable to many exceptions.
4. Plausibility. If the doer is convinced that the rule is reasonable
and even in his best interest then enforcement costs will be reduced.
5. Myopic Desirability. Any rule, internal or external, must be ini-
tially adopted by the current doer. To get over this hurdle it may be
necessary to sweeten the pot. Thus some Christmas Clubs offer a free gift
for joining, and the Army has sometimes used the strategy of the pre—enlist—
ment bonus. As Thomas Aquinas said, "Lord make me good, but not now."
.35
VI. Implications
Time Preference and the Rate of Interest
A simple result from the neoclassical theory of intertemporal choice is
that individual rates of time preference will be equal to the interest rate.
In our model this result does not apply. First we agree with B6hm—Bawerk
and Strotz that most individuals' discount functions are not exponential.
Thus, it makes no sense to talk about a single discount rate. Second, rather
than seeking the equality between the marginal productivity of waiting and
the marginal rate of time preference, individuals in our model adopt rules
(both internal and external) to overcome their high rates of time preference
in the short run. The difference between our approach and the standard
approach is well illustrated by a study by Kurz, Spiegelman and West [1973]
(hereafter "KSW").
KSW used survey techniques to try to measure the rates of time prefer-
ence of the participants of the Denver Income Maintenance Experiment. They
asked a sample of participants a series of questions of the following sort:
What size bonus would you demand today rather than collect a bonus of $100
in one year? Several different forms of this question were asked. KSW state
the standard theoretical result, and argue that different rates of time pref-
erence among groups imply different rates at which groups can borrow. To
assure that everyone in the sample was in equilibrium in the loan market
(rather than being rationed) they asked people whether they could borrow
$500 to make an installment purchase or $1000 in cash and only included
those who said they could. The results were striking. For Whites, the mean
rates of time preference implied by their answers varied from 36% to 76%.
For Blacks the rates varied between 40% and 122%. Different questions36
. eliciteddifferent mean rates but the consistent and surprising finding was
that all the rates were much higher than observed interest rates. (Subjects
were asked at what rate they could borrow and most replied in the 5—20%
range.)
The conclusion drawn by KSW is that: "The attempt to measure the rate
of time preference with an interview technique is upward biased."23 While
this conclusion may be correct, the model presented in this paper presents a
viable alternative. To us the high implicit rates of time preference are not
an anomaly. Most of the questions used offered a choice of "bonuses'1 or
"gifts." Subjects might reasonably view such choices as "exceptions" or
"special cases" and thus not governed by rules—of—thumb designed to control
myopic behavior. In fact KSW even provide some evidence for rules—of-thumb
on borrowing since 81.3% of the sample reported that they would not borrow
$1000 in cash even if they could do so at their perceived market rates of
interest (generally less than 20%). The results for Blacks seem hard to
explain only with the upward bias hypothesis. Why should the bias be 20
points higher for Blacks? On the other hand, if the responses are regarded
as true measures of underlying time preference, then the results are consist-
ent with the hypothesis advanced by Banfleld [1970] that Blacks have higher
discount rates.
Pensions and Saving
A topic of current interest is the effect of social security on saving.
Since this effect is difficult to measure directly, some attention has been
given to the related issue of the effect of pension plans on individual
saving. Our model has a clear prediction here. Since a pension plan
reduces the cost of delaying consumption, we would predict that the37
introduction of a mandatory pension plan will increasetotal saving. Put
another way, if saving is divided intopension saving and other saving then
the introduction of positive pensionsaving will produce less than a complete
offset in other saving.
It is difficult to test this prediction forseveral reasons. Most
important, there is no clear neoclassical prediction to whichit can be
compared. Some writers have described the neoclassicalprediction as a
complete offset in other saving——i.e., no net effect. Butas Feldstein
[1977] has forcefully argued, this prediction istoo simple—minded. For
example, since pensions receive preferential taxtreatment, the rate of
return to pension saving is higher. This producesan ambiguous effect on
the rate of savings accumulation.Similarly the fact that pension benefits
are typically in the form of annuitiesmay produce either more or less
saving depending on which of two effects is larger. Feldstein alsopoints
out that even if the individual wants tocompletely offset his pension
saving it may be impossible (or very expensive) for him to doso. Feldstein
concludes that:
It seems reasonable to believe at this time,on the basis of the
theoretical analysis and the available evidence, thatprivate
pensions increase the total asset accumulation of the covered
employees but by less than the full actuarial value of thepen- sions 2'-
Since our theory just predicts that the offset will beless than the
neoclassical theory would predict (and that prediction isambiguous) we can
do little more than present the estimates thatare currently available and
let the reader judge for himself.38
The first studies of this issue were done in the 1960's by Philip Cagan
[1965] and by George Katona [1965]. Although they used different data sets,
they produced similar conclusions. We will briefly summarize Cagan's results.
Cagan used a sample of respondents to a survey conducted by Consumers
Union of its members. Saving was defined as the family's change in net worth
over the year. Saving was then broken down into discretionary saving, pension
saving and other contractual saving. The issue Cagan wished to investigate
was the effect of pension saving on the two other categories. His results
are summarized in Table 1. As can be readily seen, Cagan got the surprising
result that membership in a pension plan increases other forms of saving.
He attributes this increase to what he calls the recognition effect. That
is, membership in a pension plan increases awareness of retirement needs,

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cagan'sstudy has been criticized in the literature, especially by
Munnell [1974]. The most troublesome problem is one of which Cagan was
aware: selectivity bias. Put simply, people with a taste for saving may be
more likely to work for firms which offer a pension plan. This may be a
serious problem, but to our knowledge no one has dealt with it directly.
Munnell also criticizes Cagan on other grounds and replicates his study
using the same data. However, she uses a different measure of saving,
replaces before—tax income with after—tax income, and restricts her analysis
to a subset of the observations that are thought to be more reliable. Her
results are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3
Effect of Pension Coverage on Ratio of
Nonpension Saving to Income
Model including










Source: Munnell [1974] p. 92 (numbers in parentheses are t—values)
The numbers in Table 3 are the coefficients of a pension dummy in a
regression in which the dependent variable was the nonpension saving rate.
As can be seen, the positive effect found by Cagan is no longer present, but
no significant offset is found either. The only remotely significant effect41
was in the 55—65 age group where those in a pension plan had saving rates
lower than nonmembers by 3%. Even here the t value is only 1.2. A reason-
able conclusion to draw from this study would be that (except for thosenear
retirement) pensions increase saving by their entire value. For those near
retirement the increase may be less than the total amount going into the
pension plan.
These results are clearly consistent with our model. If the true offset
is nearly zero then this is clearly less than any prediction based on a neo-
classical model. Even the finding of a positive offset for older workers is
consistent with our theory. As retirement gets closer it will become more
salient and saving will become easier.(Many find it easier to diet in the
spring since bathing suit weather is getting close)
Another more recent study by Munnell [1976] finds larger offsets. How-
ever, this study has severe data limitations. The amount saved via pensions
is unknown, so a pension dummy must be used exclusively, and the sample is
limited to men over age 45. Furthermore the results are not robust. The
estimates are reported for two different time periods and differ greatly.
In fact the estimate for the latter period implies that those having pensions
reduce their other saving by an amount three times the average value of
pension contributions in the U.S. in that year. Also, the results change
dramatically when an alternative specification is used. These problems make
it difficult to evaluate Munnell's new findings.
Perhaps future work on this issue will provide further evidence that
can be used to test our model. At the present time, however, we find the
results supportive.42
__ . VII.Summary
We now briefly recapitulate our argument. We have Investigated inter—
temporal choice as a problem in the economic theory of self—control. The
paradox of dynamic inconsistency discussed by Strotz and others is obviously
a self—control phenomenon, as Strotz's discussion seems to imply. But as
the quotation that began our article states, self—control itself is paradox-
ical unless some kind of multi—self model of man is adopted. We have intro-
duced self—control to the formal model of intertemporal choice by modeling
man as an organization——with a planner and many doers. Conflict occurs
because the doers are myopic (selfish). This conflict is fundamentally
similar to the agency relationship between the employer and the employees,
and individuals use many of the same strategies that organizations adopt to
deal with their "conflicts of interest." These strategies can involve doer
(employee) discretion while their incentives have somehow been altered or
they may entail the implementation of preconunitment (a rule) to avoid the
doer (employee) decision process altogether.
The close correspondence between the solutions to control problems
adopted by organizations and individuals provides strong support for our
model. Though our model has been nontraditional, our tools have been
strictly traditional. Formally, our model closely resembles that used by
Ross [8] in his study of the theory of agency. Finally, we note that ours




1There are precedents in theliterature. Adam Smith [1759] used a two-
self model in his Moral Sentiments. His impartialspectator corresponds to
our planner. Bihm—Bawerk [1891] discusses self—control in his Positive
Theory of Capital. We cite some passages in Sectionl. Morerecently
Schelling used the notion of precoinmitment In a game theoretic setting in
his Strategy of Conflict [1960] and hasvery recently proposed a two—self
model quite similar to ours (Schelling [1978]). Buchanan [19751 has also
discussed the rationality of self—imposed rules in a collective choice










101n addition toStrotz, this literature includes Blackorby, Nissen,
Primont and Russel [1973], Hammond [1976], Peleg and Yaari [1973], Pollak
[1968], and Yaari [1977].
11Strotz [1955],P. 179.
12
It is not necessary for our doers to be completely selfish. We make
this assumption because it is the extreme case and it makes the analysis
simpler. However, the model can easily be generalized to allow for some
consumption externalities among the doers. The only essential feature is
that the doers value current consumption relatively more than the planner.
'3For simplicity the interestrate has been suppressed. Its inclusion
would add nothing of substance to the analysis.
14 . . Notethat while rules may be adopted either to save on decision-making
costs or to mitigate a control problem, it is usually quite easy to distin-
guish between the two cases. Could institutionalized saving be explained
simply as a device to reduce decision—making costs? No. If this were the
case then individuals who joined such plans would expect to save the same
amount, on average, as they would without the plans. But clearly people
join such plans expecting to save more. Has anyone ever joined a Christmas
Club because he always had too much money saved up for gift giving?44
.
15Fora discussion of agency costs see Jensen and Neckling [1976]. For




'8Thjs idea has been suggested by Scitovsky [19761. The importance of
norms in controlling individual behavior is also stressed heavily by Adam
Smith [1759], p. 326.
19
Strotz [1955] p. 173.
20
Strotz [1955] p. 173.
point was also made by Böhm—Bawerk. "All three causes of our
underestimate of future utility.. .manifest themselves in extremely different
degrees in different individuals, and even in the same individual at differ-
ent times, according to differences of temperament and mood." B3hm—Bawerk
[1891] p. 257.
22Scitovsky [1976] has argued that food is both seductive and addictive.
It is seductive in that one is tempted to start even when not hungry and
addictive in that once started it is difficult to stop. He suggests that
the institution of meals is used to deal with these problems. By eating
only at meals one can eat until satiation is reached ((sz =O)/(6ct)).
Fancy or expensive foods are similarly controlled through the institution of
feasts.
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